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CIVIL PROCEDURE--FEDERAL COURTS-APPELLATE JURISDICTION-
PENDENT INTERLOCUTORY DENIAL OF CLASS CERTIFICATION
MAY NOT BE REVIEWED WITH APPEALABLE
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER DENYING
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz (1982)
Royce Kerchner and Bernard Ryan, inmates at the Pennyslvania State
Correctional Institution at Rockview,1 filed a class action complaint under
section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code2 alleging that the failure
of prison authorities to provide free legal supplies to indigent prisoners3 vio-
lated the United States Constitution.4 The inmates sought both preliminary
and final injunctive relief on behalf of all indigent inmates at Rockview who
were placed "in the position of either foregoing these supplies and materials
in the pursuit of legal remedies or giving up the few amenities available in
prison life." ' 5
In a single pre-trial order, the district court denied both the plaintiffs'
request for a preliminary injunction6 and their request for class certifica-
1. Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 441 (3d Cir. 1982). Plaintiff Kerch-
ner's name was docketed as "Kershner." The court retained the misspelling in the
case title but used the correct spelling throughout the opinion. Id. at 441 n.1.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Section 1983 provides for injunctive relief or dam-
ages against any person who, under color of state law deprives any person of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United
States. Id.
3. 670 F.2d at 441-42. The plaintiffs claimed that they were unable to afford
pens, paper, photocopying and postage. Id. State regulations require that
"[a]dequate legal sized paper shall be available in institution commissaries for
purchase by inmates." 37 PA. ADMIN. CODE § 93.2(a) (Shepard's 1983). Addition-
ally, the Rockview prison inmate handbook provided that certain other supplies
would be available for purchase by inmates seeking post-conviction legal remedies.
670 F.2d at 442.
4. 670 F.2d at 441-42. The plaintiffs claimed that regulations requiring pay-
ment by indigent inmates for legal supplies needed in seeking post-conviction legal
remedies interfered with a right of access to the courts implied in the sixth and four-
teenth amendments of the Constitution. Id. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817
(1977). For a discussion of prisoners' rights to seek redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
see Annot., 23 A.L.R. FED. 6 (1977).
5. 670 F.2d at 442.
6. Id. at 443. The district court approved and adopted the recommendation of
the magistrate, Raymond J. Durkin. Magistrate Durkin found that plaintiffs had
failed to show a specific instance where the inmates had been unable "to perfect and
pursue a legal action" and thus there had been no showing of "irreparable harm"
necessary for the granting of a preliminary injunction. With respect to photocopying
and postage, the magistrate specifically found that no instance had as yet been shown
where inmates were actually denied access to courts because they were unable to
photocopy documents or procure postage. Id. Additionally, the Third Circuit stated
(674)
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tion.7 The plaintiffs sought an immediate appeal of the denial of the prelim-
inary injunction 8 and, at the same time, sought appellate review of the order
denying class certification under a theory of "pendent appellate jurisdic-
tion." 9 The Third Circuit'0 affirmed the district court's denial of a prelimi-
that "Magistrate Durkin's report suggests that the plaintiffs may not have been 'indi-
gent' for the purpose of purchasing the supplies at issue here." Id. at 443.
7. Id. at 445. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. The plaintiffs' class was defined to include
all indigent inmates at SCI Rockview who have been, are, or will be in-
volved in the drafting of legal documents, the preparation of legal actions,
or in the midst of pending litigation and have been, are or will be denied
legal supplies and materials pertinent thereto or be required to purchase
them even though they are indigent or unable to bear the cost of purchas-
ing these legal supplies or materials.
Brief for Appellants at 5, Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1982).
Magistrate Durkin recommended that plaintiffs' petition for class certification be de-
nied on three grounds. First, the class failed to meet the numerosity requirement
because the number of indigent inmates at Rockview could not be determined at any
particular moment. Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, No. 80-0106, slip op. at 11-13 (M.D.
Pa. 1980) (report of Magistrate Durkin) (citing Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co.,
459 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1972)). The magistrate particularly noted that "no standard
of indigency has yet been established." Id. at 14. Second, a state-wide class, if deter-
minable, would be superior to a class of Rockview inmates and thus any remedy
afforded to the requested class would be of limited application. Id. at 15. Third,
class treatment is unnecessary where injunctive relief alone is sought as the desired
relief, because if granted, the injunction would have the same effect on the prison
administration and population as would a determination made in a class action. Id.
The plaintiffs disagreed with these findings and additionally argued before the Third
Circuit that class certification is proper where potential mootness problems exist for
named plaintiffs seeking release from prison. Brief for Appellants at 18-19, Kershner
v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1982).
8. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1970). This statute grants jurisdiction to the courts of
appeals over certain nonfinal orders and provides in pertinent part:
(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States...
granting, continuing, modifying, reftusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dis-
solve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court ...
Id. (emphasis added).
9. 670 F.2d at 445. See Marcera v. Chinlund, 595 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.), vacated on
other grounds sub. nom. Lombard v. Marcera, 442 U.S. 915 (1979). The phrase "pen-
dent appellate jurisdiction" is derived from the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in the
federal courts. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). The
plaintiffs characterized the appeal as one under 42 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(1) of a "concom-
itant order" which "touch[es] on the merits concerning the denial of the motion for a
preliminary injunction." Brief for Appellants, at 1 & n.1, Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz,
670 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1982). For the pertinent text of 28 U.S.C. § 1292, see note 8,
supra. Three issues were thus presented before the Third Circuit: 1) whether the
district court erred in denying the preliminary injunction; 2) whether the court of
appeals had jurisdiction to review the denial of class certification; and 3) if the court
had jurisdiction, whether the district court erred in denying class status. 670 F.2d at
442.
10. The case was originally heard by Circuit Judges Adams, Rosenn, and Hig-
ginbotham. The court ordered a rehearing en banc and the case was reheard by Chief
Judge Seitz and Circuit Judges Aldisert, Adams, Gibbons, Hunter, Weis, Garth, Hig-
ginbotham, and Sloviter. Judge Adams wrote the opinion of the court. Chief Judge
1982-83]
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nary injunction" and denied jurisdiction to review the denial of class
certification, 12 holdng that a pendent class certification order, not indepen-
dently reviewable, may not be reviewed in conjunction with a properly ap-
pealable order denying a preliminary injunction unless the preliminary
injunction issue cannot properly be determined without reference to the class
certification question. Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1982)
(en banc).
The Constitution grants to Congress the power to establish the lower
federal courts 13 and thus the exclusive power to define the jurisdiction of the
intermediate appellate courts. 4 Congress has exercised that power by enact-
ing section 1291 of the Judicial Code, extending jurisdiction in the courts of
appeal to only "final decisions" of the United States district courts. 15 The
Seitz filed a concurring opinion. Judge Higginbotham filed an opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part.
11. 670 F.2d at 443-45. This note will examine the court's determination of the
appealability of the denial of class certification; reference will be made to the prelimi-
nary injunction issue only as is necessary to a discussion of the appealability of the
class certification denial issue. A brief summary of the court's unanimous determina-
tion of the injunction issue is presented here.
A decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction is within the discretion of
the trial judge and appellate review is limited to whether the trial judge abused that
discretion. Id. at 443 (citing Continental Group Inc. v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 614
F.2d 351, 357 (3d Cir. 1980)). The plaintiffs must show that they will be "irreparably
harmed" if such relief is not granted and that there is a probability of success on the
merits. Id. (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharmaceuticals Laboratories, Inc., 630
F.2d 120, 136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 1014 (1980); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith,
637 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1980)). In Kershner, the magistrate's finding that not a
single instance of a denial of access to the courts had been shown precluded a finding
of "irreparable harm," and the finding that the plaintiffs may not have been "indi-
gent" indicated an improbability of success on the merits. Id. at 445. While the
Third Circuit's review was limited to whether the district court abused its discretion,
it specifically agreed with the magistrate's findings. Id.
12. Id. at 442. Because the court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the
class certification issue it did not reach the issue of the merits of the class. Id. For a
discussion of the lower court's opinion on the merits of the class certification issue, see
note 7 supra.
13. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Article III provides, "The judicial power of the
United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as Con-
gress may from time to time establish." Id.
14. See Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control theJurisdi'ction of Lower Fed-
eral Courts. A Critical Review anda New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 46-47 (1975).
Jurisdiction has been defined as "the power to declare the law, and when it ceases to
exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact [that it
is without jurisdiction) and dismissing the cause." Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). For a comprehensive discussion of appellate court jurisdic-
tion, see 9 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, §§ 110.01-110.30; WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, JURISDICTION §§ 3901-
3937 (1976). "Appellate jurisdiction," as used in this note, refers only to the jurisdic-
tion of the intermediate federal courts and not that of the Supreme Court.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). Section 1291 provides that "[tihe courts of appeals
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the
United States. . . except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
Id. This rule extends back to the earliest days of the United States. See Judiciary Act
[Vol. 28: p. 674
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final decision rule serves two major judicial policies. First, it serves to protect
litigants from the waste of time and expense incurred in "piecemeal litiga-
tion." 16 Second, it serves to protect the authority and independence of the
trial judge over the litigation by preventing constant review of numerous
trial court orders. 17 However, over time this rule has become subject to both
statutory exceptions and expanding judicial interpretations of what is "fi-
nal." These developments have resulted from recognition of a need to pro-
tect litigants from the harm that may result if review is delayed.18
The first, and most widely used statutory exception to the final decision
rule provided for immediate review of interlocutory orders granting or con-
tinuing an injunction. '9 This exception is now found at section 1292(a)(1) of
the Judicial Code and has been expanded to allow appeals from orders refus-
ing or dissolving injunctions. 20 The purpose of the injunctions exception is
"to permit litigants to effectually challenge interlocutoiy orders of serious,
perhaps irreparable, consequences."'2'
of 1789, §§ 21, 22, 25; 1 Stat. 73, 83-85. A "final decision" is generally "one which
ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute
the judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). But see Gillespie v.
United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 149, 152 (1964) ("finality" to be given a "practi-
cal rather than technical construction.").
16. See Canter v. American Ins. Co., 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 307, 317 (1830). In Canter,
Justice Story noted, "It is of great importance to the due administration of justice
• . . that causes should not come up in fragments, upon successive appeals. It would
occasion very great delays and oppressive expenses." Id. at 318. Justice Frankfurter
posited that a rule of finality "avoid[s] the obstruction to just claims that would come
from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the
various rulings to which a litigation may give rise. . . . To be effective, judicial ad-
ministration must not be leaded-footed." Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323,
325 (1940).
17. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) (per-
mitting appeals from nonfinal orders "would undermine the independence of the
district judge"); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)
("Appeal gives the upper court a power of review, not of intervention"). See also
Parkinson v. April Indus., 520 F.2d 650, 652 (2d Cir. 1975); Note, Interlocutory Appeals
fiom Orders Striking Class Action Allegations, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1292, 1302 (1970);
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 3907, at 430-33.
18. See Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204 (1848). The Supreme
Court has written that the rule of finality "has been departed from only when obser-
vance of it would practically defeat the right to any review at all." Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-25 (1940).
19. Evarts Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 7; 26 Stat. 828.
20. 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1) (1976). The expansion to allow appeals from orders
refusing or dissolving injunctions occurred in the Act of February 18, 1895, 28 Stat.
666. This provision was again amended in 1925 to add interlocutory orders modify-
ing or refusing to modify injunctions. See Act of February 13, 1925, 43 Stat. 936. For
the full text of § 1292(a)(1), see note 8 supra. Other statutory exceptions include or-
ders refusing to wind up receiverships, orders determining the rights of parties in
admiralty proceedings, and orders in cases of patent infringement which are final but
for accounting. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2)-1292(a)(4). For the history of the statu-
tory exceptions to the "final decision" rule, see generally 9 J. MOORE, supra note 14,
at 110.16.
21. Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955).
1982-83] .677
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Although not covered by a statutory exception, a trial court's order
which is not determinative of the issue being litigated may nonetheless be
deemed a final order for purposes of immediate appeal through expansive
judicial definition. For example, in Forgay o. Conrad,22 the Supreme Court
first expanded the definition of "final decision" and allowed appellate review
of an order which would have been final but for the performance of some
ministerial duties and where "irreparable harm" would otherwise have re-
sulted. 23 Subsequent decisions have allowed appeals from orders "collat-
eral" to the rights asserted in the action ("collateral order doctrine");24
orders of "marginal finality" where delay may cause injustice ("Gillespie
Rule");2 5 and orders which, for all practical purposes, will terminate the
22. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848).
23. Id. at 204. The defendants in Forgay appealed from a decree setting aside
certain deeds as fraudulent, and in which the trial court directed a master to take an
accounting and ordered that certain slaves be delivered to plaintiffs. The Court, by
Chief Justice Taney, held that an appeal could nonetheless be taken, finding that if
the appellants must wait until the accounts are reported by the master and confirmed
by the court, they will be subjected to irreparable injury because their property
would be sold and the proceeds distributed among their creditors before they could
be heard in defense of their rights. Id. The Forgay Court treated the order appealed
from as final but subsequent decisions recognized it as interlocutory. See Craighead
v. Wilson, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 199, 202 (1855). The Forgay rule most properly applies
to orders compelling the transfer of physical property. See Radio Station WOW v.
Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 126 (1945).
24. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The Cohen
collateral order doctrine requires: 1) that the right asserted on appeal have been
finally determined; 2) that it be severable from the rights asserted in the main action
and 3) that the order be "too important to be denied review and too independent of
the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole
case is adjudicated." Id. at 546. See also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977)
(applying "collateral order" doctrine to order denying motion to dismiss criminal
indictment on double jeopardy grounds); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534
F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976) (order denying motion to disqual-
ify counsel appealable as a "collateral order").
The Cohen exception has been subsequently restated to apply to all orders which
"conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the action and [are] effectively unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)
(footnote omitted) (refusing to apply the doctrine to an order denying class certifica-
tion). For a detailed discussion of Coopers &Lybrand, see notes 30-34 and accompany-
ing text tifra.
25. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 149 (1964). The plaintiffs in
Gillespie, the mother and dependent brothers and sisters of a deceased seaman,
brought a diversity action against the decedent's employer under the Jones Act and
an Ohio wrongful death statute. The district judge issued an interlocutory order,
ruling that the Jones Act provided the exclusive remedy and struck the state claims.
Id. at 150-51. The Supreme Court held that such an order-"of marginal finality"-
is reviewable by a court of appeals as "fundamental to the further conduct of the
case." Id. at 154. The Court noted that "in deciding the question of finality, the
most important competing considerations are 'the inconvenience and cost of piece-
meal review on the one hand and the danger of delaying justice on the other.' " Id. at
152-53 (quoting Dickenson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511
(1950)). One commentator has explained the development of the Gillespie rule that,
given the extensive review of the record required to determine the jurisdictional ques-
[Vol. 28: p. 674
5
Congdon: Civil Procedure - Federal Courts - Appellate Jurisdiction - Pende
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1983
1982-83] THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
litigation if unreviewed ("death knell doctrine"). 26
The "death knell doctrine" was particularly applicable to situations in
which litigants sought immediate review of interlocutory orders denying
class certification. 27 Given the often devastating effect that refusal to certify
a class action may have on the litigation, 28 litigants have contended that
tion, "[i]t would be stultifying to hold that [a court of appeals] is utterly without
power to speak unless it first determines the jurisdictional question favorably." 9 J.
MOORE, supra note 14, § 110.12, at 151. See also Note, The Ftah'ty and Appealabthiy of
Interlocutory Orders-A Structural Reform Toward Redefitniton, 7 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1037,
1046-47 (1972).
26. Under the "death knell" doctrine, if an order of the district court has the
practical effect of terminating the litigation, the order is final within the meaning of
28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967) (Eisen I). In Eisen I, plaintiff brought a class action on
behalf of himself and other purchasers and sellers of "odd lot" securities against two
"odd lot" dealers alleging a conspiracy to monopolize trading. Id. at 119-20. The
district court denied plaintiff's motion for class certification but allowed plaintiff's
individual action to proceed. Id. at 120. The Second Circuit allowed an immediate
appeal and held that where plaintiff's individual claim was for a mere $70, such an
order may be appealed as a "final decision." The court reasoned that, "We can
safely assume that no lawyer of competence is going to undertake this complex and
costly case to recover $70." Id. See also Ott v. Speedwriting Pub. Co., 518 F.2d 1143
(6th Cir. 1975) (denial of class certification appealable where named plaintiff's dam-
ages totalled $30); Hartman v. Scott, 488 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1973) (where only claim
remaining after pre-trial rulings was a damage claim for $1, denials of class certifica-
tion and motion to convene a three judge panel immediately appealable). But see
Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1972). The Hackett court re-
jected the "death knell" doctrine in a class certification context on the grounds that it
could not apply where jurisdiction requires an amount in controversy and, further,
the court rejected the underlying premise of the doctrine, noting that the availability
of attorney's fees in many cases would be sufficient to encourage lawyers to accept the
case. Id. at 623. The court also noted that an appeal may be taken under FED. R.
Civ. P. 54(b) or 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)). Id at 623-24. Accord King v. Kansas City S.
Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1973).
27. See note 26 supra.
28. See Note, Immediate Appealabi'ty of Orders Denying Class Certiftation, 40 OHIo
ST. L.J. 441, 443-44 (1979). Class action certification orders affect decisions to pro-
ceed or settle, decisions of strategy, and decisions of discovery and evidence. Id. An
interlocutory denial of class status can cause "irreparable harm" to a named plain-
tiff's cause when he is left alone to prosecute a costly and complex case. See, e.g.,
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035
(1967) (denial of class status may toll the "death knell" of the action). Additionally,
denial of class status may also cause harm to the putative class left without a cham-
pion. See, e.g., City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d
295, 301 (2d Cir. 1969) (Hays, J., dissenting). In the latter situation, later appeal will
not be guaranteed as the named plaintiff might win his own litigation and, as a
result, have no need to appeal the denial of class status. See, Note, supra note 17, at
1293-94. Should the victorious "champion" appeal in the interest of the putative
class members, and succeed on appeal he may be forced to relitigate to prevent "one-
way intervention" under Rule 23; otherwise putative class members may be free to
decide whether to join based on the "champion's" proven success. Id. See also
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. dented, 427 U.S. 912
(1976). Jiminez involved the question of whether a district judge could defer ruling
on class status until after proceeding to the merits of the case, so the issue of "one-way
intervention" was more clearly presented. It should be noted that putative class
6
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immediate review is essential.29 However, in 1978, the Supreme Court
closed down the "death knell" avenue for appealability of orders denying
class certification. In Coopers &Lybrandv. Li'vesay,30 the Court held that "the
fact that an interlocutory order may induce a party to abandon his claim
before final judgment is not a sufficient reason for considering it a 'final deci-
sion' within the meaning of § 129 1."3' The Court rejected the notion that
any special consideration should be afforded class certification rulings32 and
found that "[t]he appealability of any order entered in a class action is deter-
mined by the same standards that govern appealability in other types of
litigation."'33 The Court felt that "the principle vice of the 'death knell' doc-
trine [was] that it authorize[d] indiscriminate review of decisions made by
the trial judge."'34
members may intervene after the entry of final judgment to appeal a denial of class
status, thereby freeing the "champion" from this dilemma. United Airlines Inc. v.
McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977). However, it is unlikely that the judgment in favor
of the "champion" below would be given collateral estoppel effect to all class mem-
bers. See Note, supra note 17, at 40; Note, supra, at 471-72.
29. While this note is concerned with the need of plaintiffs to appeal the denial
of class status, defendants, facing the burdensome costs of defending large class action
suits, have been equally active in seeking the immediate review of a grant of class
status. See, e.g., Herbst v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 1310 (2d
Cir. 1974); Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094, 1098-99 (2d Cir. 1974).
Herbst and Kohn applied the "reverse death knell" doctrine which holds that a grant
of class status is immediately appealable where the defendant can show that the prac-
tical effect of reversal on appeal would be the termination of the litigation. See also
Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973),oacatedon other grounds, 417
U.S. 156 (1974) (Eisen III). See generally, Comment, Appellate Review of the Grant or
Denial of Class Action Status, 18 B.C.L. REV. 101, 119-20 (1977); Note, Class Action
Certification Orders, An Argument for Defendants' Right to Appeal, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
621 (1974). But see Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1975) (rejecting "re-
verse death knell" doctrine).
30. 437 U.S. 463 (1978). The plaintiffs in Coopers &Lybrand, purchasers of secur-
ities in reliance on a prospectus, brought suit on behalf of themselves and others
similarly situated, alleging violations of federal securities law. The district court first
certified the class under FED. R. Civ. P. 23, but then reconsidered and decertified the
class. 437 U.S. at 466. Plaintiffs appealed immediately to the Eighth Circuit which
accepted jurisdiction under the "death knell" doctrine and reversed the trial court.
Livesay v. Punta Gorda Isles, Inc., 550 F.2d 1106, 1110 (8th Cir. 1977).
31. 437 U.S. at 477. This holding has been referred to as the "death knell of the
death knell." See Note, supra note 28.
32. 437 U.S. at 470. The court noted that "[t]here are special rules relating to
class actions and, to that extent, they are a special kind of litigation. Those rules do
not, however, contain any unique provisions governing appeals." Id. See notes 26-29
and accompanying text supra.
33. 437 U.S. at 470.
34. Id. at 474. As an alternative, the Court recommended the use of § 1292(b)
which provides for a discretionary interlocutory appeal where the district judge certi-
fies the order as involving a "controlling question of law as to which there is substan-
tial ground for difference of opinion" and that immediate appeal would "materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1976). Section 1292(b) was enacted to facilitate appeals, but, it should be noted, its
use requires the consent of the court of appeals which might deny review for any
reason at all, including a crowded court docket. See S. REP. No. 2434, 85th Cong., 2d
[Vol. 28: p. 674
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On the same day the Court decided Coopers & Lybrand, it handed down
its decision in Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. ,3' which construed the
statutory exceptions to the final decision rule as applied to class certification
orders. In Gardner, an unsuccessful applicant for employment sought injunc-
tive relief on behalf of herself and other women harmed by the respondent's
alleged policy of sex discrimination.3 6 The petitioner appealed from an in-
terlocutory order denying class certification and invoked the injunction ex-
ception of section 1292(a)(1) to sustain appellate jurisdiction.3 7 She argued
that, as the scope of injunctive relief sought on behalf of the class was
broader than that sought for herself, the denial of class status had effectively
denied the request for an injunction. 38 The Gardner Court held that a class
denial order having no direct or irreparable effect on the merits of the con-
troversy, was not appealable as a denial of an injunction. 39 The Court, con-
cluding that such a rule would defeat the policy against piecemeal appeals
expressed by the final decision rule, added that, since section 1292(a)(1) is an
exception, "it must be approached gingerly 'lest a floodgate be opened that
brings into the exception many pretrial orders.' "40
The Supreme Court has never determined the limits of an appellate
Sess. 2, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6256. See generally Note,
Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 HARV. L. REV.
607 (1974). Whether § 1292(b) may be invoked to review class certification orders
has been a question of some controversy. Appeal under § 1292(b) requires the ap-
proval of both the district court and the court of appeals, a fact which poses initial
uncertainty. Some commentators have suggested that a district judge would be un-
likely to certify for appeal a challenged certification denial of his own making. See,
e.g., 1 NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS, § 2181, at 636 (1977). It is also questionable
whether a class action determination can involve a "controlling question of law." See
Note, supra note 17, at 1297. The use of § 1292(b) has also been objected to on the
grounds that many aspects of a Rule 23 motion are left to the discretion of the trial
judge. It has been suggested that § 1292(b) is inappropriate to review discretionary
orders. See 9 J. MOORE, supra note 14, at 110.22[2] (1973); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS, § 203 (1970). Despite these objections, § 1292(b) has been exer-
cised to review class orders. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 756 (3d
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974) (determining that § 1292(b) review
hinges on whether "the order . . . implicates the policies favoring interlocutory ap-
peal"). See also Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1977); Lukenas
v. Bryce's Mountain Resort, Inc., 538 F.2d 594 (4th Cir. 1976).
35. 437 U.S. 478 (1978).
36. Id. at 479.
37. Id. at 480.
38. Id. The Gardner plaintiff was not employed by the defendant at the time of
suit. Id. at 479. The injunction requested included enjoining current employer prac-
tices and the class requested to be certified included current employees of the defend-
ant. Id. As plaintiff herself was not harmed by defendant's current practices, the
denial of class status effectively denied that portion of the relief sought. Id. at 480.
See also Brunson v. Board of Trustees, 311 F.2d 107, 108 (4th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
373 U.S. 933 (1963) (order denying class status was a denial of broad injunctive relief
sought).
39. 437 U.S. at 480-81.
40. Id. at 482 (quoting Switzerland Cheese Ass'n, Inc. v. E. Home's Market,
Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 24 (1966)).
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court's power, in reviewing a properly appealable interlocutory order, to re-
view other matters and other non final orders under the technique popularly
known as "pendent appellate jurisdiction. '4 1 The general rule established
by the courts of appeals, although subject to exception, is that an appellate
court will go no further in deciding the merits of a case than is necessary to
decide the issue properly on appeal. 42 In Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works,4 3 the
Supreme Court did create one exception to this rule, holding that a court of
appeals in reviewing an properly appealable interlocutory order, may extend
jurisdiction to the entire case where it is apparent that the cause should be
dismissed altogether.44 Some courts have used this rule to extend jurisdic-
41. One commentator has suggested that once an appeal is properly before an
appellate court, its authority should be "plenary to the extent that it chooses to exer-
cise it." 9 J. MOORE, supra note 14, 119.25[2], at 273. Few courts have chosen to
exercise this broad authority. See Yamamoto v. Omiya, 564 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir.
1977). In Yamamoto, a unanimous panel of the Ninth Circuit allowed an appeal from
an order denying class certification in conjunction with an order striking plaintiff's
prayer for injunctive relief. The court reasoned that such review was "[i]n the inter-
est of judicial economy" and stated, "While, in an interlocutory appeal, an appellate
court will normally concern itself with the order from which the appeal is taken, the
court has the power to consider all issues should it decide to do so." Id. at 1325 n. 11
(emphasis added). But see Marks v. San Francisco Real Estate Bd., 627 F.2d 947 (9th
Cir. 1980). In Marks, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit refused to review a class
certification denial with its reversal of the trial court's dismissal for failure to prose-
cute. Such review, it reasoned, would be contrary to the Supreme Court's policy
against interlocutory review of class certification denials. Id. at 951 (Sneed, J., con-
curring) (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978)). See notes 30-40
and accompanying text supra.
42. See Ex parte National Enameling & Stamping Co., 201 U.S. 156 (1906) (de-
clining to review a cross-appeal from decree enjoining patent infringement); Caterpil-
lar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 F.2d 82 (1941) (refusing to review
trial judges' interlocutory rulings as to defenses in conjunction with cross-appeal from
order granting injunction).
43. 165 U.S. 518 (1897).
44. Id. at 525. In Smith, a patent case, the trial court entered an interlocutory
order ruling that the patent sued upon was valid and had been infringed upon. Id. at
518. The court granted an injunction against further infringement and ordered a
master to take an accounting. Id. The defendant appealed the granting of the in-
junction and assigned as error the rulings as to validity and infringement. Id. The
Ninth Circuit denied plaintiffs motion to dismiss all portions of the appeal not re-
lated to the injunction and reversed the decree of the trial court in its entirety. Id.
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals had jurisdiction to dismiss plain-
tiff's entire case. It reasoned as follows:
The manifest intent of this provision [the predecessor to § 1292(a)(1)] read
in light of the previous practice in the Courts of the United States ...
appears to this court to have been, not only to permit the defendant to
obtain immediate relief from an injunction, the continuance of which ...
might seriously affect his interests; but also to save both parties the expense
of further litigation, should the appellate court be of the opinion that the
plaintiff was not entitled to relief because his bill had no equity to support
it.
Id. at 525. See Mecanno Ltd. v. Wanamaker, 253 U.S. 136 (1920); Eighth Regional
War Labor Bd. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 145 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 883 (1945); Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944). Cf NLRB
v. Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 610 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1979) (appellate court will not
[Vol. 28: p. 674
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tion to "other orders, although interlocutory and themselves non-appealable,
and other questions as are basic to and underlie the order supporting the
appeal."
45
Several tests of "pendent appellate jurisdiction" have arisen within the
courts of appeal. In General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 4 6 the Second
Circuit adopted a test that would permit discretionary review when "the
appealable order will involve consideration of factors relevant to the other-
wise nonappealable order."'47 Subsequently, in New York v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission ,48 the court explained that such a rule applies where there is a
sufficient overlap of issues and little extra effort is required to resolve both
questions. 49 The court found this rule to expedite the litigation and save the
parties from wasteful expenditures of time and money. 50 The Seventh Cir-
cuit, inJenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual Hospital Insurance Co. ,'51 formulated a dif-
review a discovery order in conjunction with an injunction denial unless the plead-
ings fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted).
The Second Circuit, reviewing the grant of an injunction, extended jurisdiction
under Smith to direct a verdict in favor of plaintiff. Hurwitz v. Director's Guild, Inc.,
364 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 971 (1966).
45. 9 J. MOORE, supra note 14, 110.25[1], at 270. The cases cited for this rule
generally allow review of jurisdictional questions decided by the trial court which are
not otherwise appealable until after the entry of final judgment. See, e.g., Deckert v.
Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940) (allowing review of motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction in conjunction with order
granting a temporary injunction); Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 184 F.2d 537 (3d
Cir. 1950) (allowing review of a removal order with an injunction order). Professor
Moore has noted that "[a] court should not close its eyes to what is plainly there." 9
J. MOORE, supra note 14, 110.25[1], at 273. See Sims v. Mack Truck Corp., 608
F.2d 87, 94 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930 (1980) (reviewing a cross-appeal
from grant of summary judgment on unfair competition claim concurrently with
§ 1292(a)(4) appeal).
46. 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
47. Id. at 648. In General Motors, the Second Circuit was asked to review an
interlocutory order granting class status in conjunction with an order refusing to dis-
qualify plaintiff's counsel, the latter of which was appealable as a final decision under
the "collateral order" doctrine. Id. at 644. The court refused to review the class
certification issue as it was not appealable under any of the exceptions to § 1291, nor
was it appealable under a theory of pendent appellate jurisdiction as "no such over-
lap [of relevant factors] exists between the order granting class action status and the
order denying disqualification of counsel." Id. at 648. See also Marcera v. Chinlund,
595 F.2d 1231, 1236 n.8 (2d Cir.), vacatedon othergrounds sub nom. Lombard v. Marcera,
442 U.S. 915 (1979); Sanders v. Levy, 558 F.2d 636, 643 (2d Cir. 1976), aj'don this
poit en banc, 558 F.2d 646, 647-48 (2d Cir.), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Oppenheimer
Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1977). See also Stewart-Warner Corp. v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822, 826 (2d Cir. 1963) (order striking certain counter-
claims and affirmative defenses appealable with order denying defendant's
counterclaim for injunctive relief as the two issues were "inextricably interwoven").
48. 550 F.2d 7,45 (2d Cir. 1977).
49. Id. at 760. Judge Waterman, writing for the court, reasoned that review in
such cases of a concurrent class certification order "required no greater expenditure
of effort by [the appellate court]." Id.
50. Id.
51. 522 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1975),af'don rehearbng, 538 F.2d 164, cert. denied, 429
U.S. 986 (1976).
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ferent test and held that an otherwise nonappealable order of the district
court may be reviewed concurrently with a properly appealable order, where
the trial court's determination of the former "directly controlled" its deter-
mination of the latter.
52
Cases in the Third Circuit have covered the spectrum of rules governing
the scope of permissible interlocutory review. Early cases within the circuit
appeared to recognize a broad grant of authority to review interlocutory
orders in their entirety once an appeal was properly taken. In D'Iorio v.
County of Delaware,5 3 the defendant appealed an order granting injunctive
relief. The Third Circuit held that when appellate jurisdiction is established
under section 1292(a)(1), the court may review the entire order, and not
merely the grant of injunctive relief.54 However, in W.L. Gore &Associates v.
52. Id. at 1238. The plaintiff in Jenkins brought an action in federal court on
behalf of herself and other minority female employees of the defendant employer
alleging sexual and racial discrimination in employee evaluation practices. Id. at
1236. The district court denied plaintiffs motion for class certification and thereafter
denied her motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. The plaintiff's individual claim
was moot as she was no longer employed by defendant. Id. at 1237. "[O]nly if the
district court erred in denying the plaintiff the right to proceed as representative of
the class . . . could its subsequent refusal to grant a preliminary injunction be seri-
ously challenged." Id. Thus, the court reasoned that where a plaintiff's motion for
preliminary injunction was brought on behalf of a class which the district court had
refused to certify, the class action determination "directly controlled" the prelimi-
nary injunction issue. Id. at 1238 n.5. The plaintiffs motion for a preliminary in-
junction distinguishes Jenkins from Gardner. See Gardner v. Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. at 479 n.3. See also notes 35-40 and accompanying text
supra. It should be noted that, at the time ofjenkins, the Seventh Circuit had already
rejected the "death knell" doctrine of independent appealability of class action deter-
minations. See note 26 supra. Other formulations by the Seventh Circuit under this
rule are less clear but it appears that some logical interrelationship between legal
issues is required, not merely an overlap of legal or factual issues. See Adashunas v.
Negley, 636 F.2d 600, 602 (7th Cir. 1980) (denial of preliminary injunction and class
certification denial both reviewable as the two are "interdependent"). Adashunas was
heavily relied on by the plaintiffs in Kershner in seeking concurrent review. See Reply
Brief of Appellants at 2, Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1982). The
Jenkins rule has been applied in the Seventh Circuit only to cases involving concur-
rent review of class denials. In other types of cases the court has applied the "basic to
and underlying" test. See Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 628 F.2d
1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1980) (order granting partial summary judgment for defendant
reviewable with order denying plaintiff preliminary injunction as former was "the
basis" of the latter); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., Inc., 560
F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1070 (1977) (order separating issues
for trial not reviewable with preliminary injunction order). Cf In re Oil Spill by
Amoco Cadiz, 659 F.2d 789, 793 n.5 (7th Cir. 1981) (appellate court may examine on
appeal all issues underlying district court's order certified for appeal under
§ 1292(b)). Compare Emerson Elec. Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 606 F.2d 234,
237 (8th Cir. 1979) (order transferring proceeding to another district court, not inde-
pendently appealable, was the "underlying basis" for order denying injunction
against proceedings in another jurisdiction and was therefore reviewable).
53. 592 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1978).
54. Id. at 685 n.4. In D'Iorio, the plaintiff brought suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1983
against Delaware County, the Delaware County District Attorney (plaintiff's em-
ployer), and the County Council alleging that his dismissal from employment vio-
lated both the county Home Rule Charter and the due process requirements of the
[Vol. 28: p. 674
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Car/isle Corp. ,'55 the Third Circuit viewed its appellate jurisdiction more re-
strictively. The Gore court limited appellate review of an interlocutory order
enjoining further patent infringement to consideration of that issue and
other interlocutory orders relating to infringement and patent validity as
"have bearing on the propriety of the action of [district] court with respect to
the injunction." 56 However, a later case, Concerned Citizens of Bushkill Town-
ship o. Costle, 57 adopted the most restrictive rule to date. The Costle court
limited its appellate jurisdiction solely to the district court's refusal to grant
injunctive relief.58
It was against this background that Judge Adams, writing for the ma-
jority, sought to resolve the question of whether the appellate court had ju-
risdiction to review the denial of class certification in conjunction with the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 683-84. The federal
district court held that the firing violated the Home Rule Charter and ordered the
plaintiff reinstated with back pay. The court, however, retained jurisdiction of the
case pending decisions concerning an award of attorney's fees and expungement of
the dismissal from plaintiff's employment record. Defendants, however, appealed
prior to a determination of those issues. Id. In reviewing the order granting injunc-
tive relief, the court of appeals undertook to review, and affirmed the defendants'
objections that the lower court should have stayed proceedings in federal court under
the "abstention doctrine" pending a construction of the Home Rule Charter by the
Pennsylvania state courts. Id. at 685. As such, the case may more properly be an
extension of the Smith rule, notwithstanding the court's broad language. See notes 41-
45 and accompanying text supra. For cases following the apparent broad grant of
authority espoused in D'Iorio, see Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 715 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979) (appellate court may review order dismissing claim
for compensation of future medical expenses incurred as result of exposure to fallout
from nuclear testing in conjunction with order denying injunction); Kohn v. Ameri-
can Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 262 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972)
(reviewing the full merits of the case while issue of injunction properly before court)
(citing Smith v. Vulcan Iron Works, 165 U.S. 518, 525 (1897)). It is interesting to
note that Chief Judge Seitz wrote the Kohn opinion. For a discussion of Chief Judge
Seitz' concurring opinion in the principle case, see notes 76-77 and accompanying
text iqfra.
55. 529 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1976).
56. Id. at 618. Prior to Kershner, Gore had been relied on by the Third Circuit
only in patent cases where appellate jurisdiction was sought to review rulings con-
cerning patent validity and infringement. See Paeco, Inc. v. Applied Moldings, Inc.,
562 F.2d 870, 879-80 (3d Cir. 1979) (appellate court refused to review trial court's
interlocutory order awarding attorney's fees to defendant where plaintiff's "prosecu-
tion of the patent was unfair and inequitable" as such ruling was "irrelevant" to the
denial of injunctive relief).
57. 592 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979).
58. Id. at 168. In Costle, local groups and residents filed suit against the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) seeking to enjoin the development of a sewer
authority. Subsequently, the EPA entered into a contract with the plaintiffs defer-
ring action on the proposed construction. The district court denied a motion by the
defendant-intervenor, recipient of a federal grant, to restrain the EPA from entering
into this contract. Id. at 165. The district court also denied the intervenor's motion
for leave to file a supplementary answer with cross-claims. Id. at 165 n.2. The appel-
late court accepted review only of that portion of the order refusing to grant an
injunction but declined to review the orders denying leave to file the cross-claims
which were not otherwise appealable. Id. at 168 n.7.
1982-831
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review of the denial of the preliminary injunction. 59 He began by noting
that the issue of pendent appellate jurisdiction was specifically left open by
the Supreme Court.60 Judge Adams then reviewed the case law within the
Third Circuit and found that the court had "never formulated a consistent
approach to the question.1 6 1 Judge Adams also recognized that some earlier
cases had indeed prescribed a broad grant of authority to the court to review
concurrent nonappealable orders.62 However, Judge Adams recognized as
well that later cases decided by the Third Circuit specifically limited the
reach of such pendent jurisdiction.63
Having noted the apparent inconsistencies in the law of the circuit, the
majority opinion turned to an examination of the laws and policies of appel-
late review.64 Judge Adams recognized that appellate jurisdiction is con-
ferred only by statute and that the exceptions to the rule of finality were
enacted to prevent litigants from suffering irreparable harm.65 Judge Ad-
ams then observed that review of the denial of a preliminary injunction is a
statutory exception to the general rule of finality and must be construed
59. 670 F.2d at 445. The discussion of the appealability of the class denial fol-
lowed the court's unanimous affirmance of the district court's order denying a pre-
liminary injunction. For a discussion of that issue, see note 11 supra.
60. 670 F.2d at 445 n.6 (citing Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437
U.S. at 479 n.3). In Gardner, the Supreme Court noted that the "[p]etitioner did not
file a motion for a preliminary injunction; for that reason, the issue [of pendent ap-
pellate jurisdiction] decided in [enkins] is not before us." 437 U.S. at 479 n.3.
61. 670 F.2d at 445.
62. Id. at 445-46 (citing D'Iorio v. County of Delaware, 592 F.2d 681 (3d Cir.
1978); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 874 (1972)). For a discussion of these earlier Third Circuit decisions, see notes
53-54 and accompanying text supra.
63. 670 F.2d at 446 (citing W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. Carlisle Corp., 529 F.2d 614
(1976); Concerned Citizens of Bushkill Twp. v. Costle, 592 F.2d 164 (1979). For a
discussion of this more limited approach within the Third Circuit, see notes 55-58
and accompanying text supra. Noting that the Kohn reasoning was "explicitly con-
stricted," Judge Adams quoted from the Gore opinion:
Our decision in Kohn ...is not to the contrary. For in that case an injunc-
tion was the principal relief sought and all the issues decided by the district
court in its interlocutory judgment which was appealed under § 1292(a)(1)
appear to have been involved in the plaintiff's right to injunctive relief.
670 F.2d at 446 (quoting W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. Carlisle Corp., 529 F.2d at 618).
Judge Adams found Costle to represent a "narrow approach" restricting jurisdiction
"to the literal terms of the statute." Id. (citing Concerned Citizens of Bushkill Twp.
v. Costle, 592 F.2d at 168).
64. 670 F.2d at 446-47.
65. Id. at 447 (citing Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Corp.,'437 U.S. at
480; Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955); Carson v.
American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981)). Judge Adams passed over the opportu-
nity to discuss in more detail the rationale behind the exceptions to the final decision
rule, stating only that "[t]he history of § 1292 has been recounted elsewhere . ..."
Id. at 446 (citing Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955); Katz
v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 753-54 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885
(1974); Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 325 F.2d 822, 829-30 (2d
Cir. 1963) (Friendly, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 944 (1964)).
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"with great care and circumspection." 66 The court then concluded that the
apparent board authority granted by the earlier Third Circuit decisions "ap-
pears directly to contravene the admonition of the Supreme Court" to ap-
proach the statutory exceptions "gingerly lest a floodgate be opened" to
many pretrial orders.6
7
Judge Adams next reviewed the approaches to the issue taken by other
circuits, particularly the Second and Seventh Circuits. 6 8 Concluding that
the holdings of those circuits supported a restrictive view of pendent appel-
late jurisdiction, 69 the Kershner majority formulated a rule for the Third Cir-
cuit that an interlocutory class denial order will not be reviewed on the
appeal of a denial of a preliminary injunction unless the latter cannot be
resolved without reference to the former, either because the class denial or-
der directly controls the decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction
or because the two issues are "in some other way, inextricably bound."
70
The court concluded that this rule would serve three policies. First, noting
the temporary nature of class certification orders, Judge Adams found the
rule to preserve the independence of the trial judge. 71 Second, the rule
66. 670 F.2d at 447 (citing Switzerland Cheese Ass'n v. E. Home's Market, Inc.,
385 U.S. 23 (1966)). See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
67. 670 F.2d at 447 (quoting Switzerland Cheese Ass'n v. E. Horne's Market,
Inc., 385 U.S. 23, 24 (1966)). Judge Adams noted that the Kohn case appeared to rely
on the Smith rule. Id. For a discussion of Smith, see notes 43-45 and accompanying
text supra. He concluded that such reliance was "misplaced," distinguishing Smith
from Kohn on the ground that the former only applied to dismiss the entire complaint
and served "the obvious interest of economy of litigation." Id. at 447-48 (quoting
Hurwitz v. Directors Guild of Am., Inc., 364 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 971 (1966)).
68. 670 F.2d 447-48. The Kershner court concluded that the Second Circuit view
is that where there is a "sufficient overlap" of relevant factors, the appellate court
may review a nonappealable order concurrently with an appealable order. Id. at
448. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's test, see notes 46-50 and accompanying
iext supra. The Third Circuit then construed the opinions of the Seventh Circuit as
holding that where the determination of a nonappealable order "directly controlled"
the determination of an appealable order, the appellate court may exercise concomi-
tant review. 670 F.2d at 448. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's test, see notes
51-52 and accompanying text supra.
69. 670 F.2d at 448.
70. Id. at 449. The court concluded that earlier Third Circuit cases construing a
broad grant of jurisdiction under the injunctions exception were incorrectly decided
and that, without further action by the Congress, an appellate court should not pro-
ceed beyond review of the preliminary injunction issue. Id. at 448-49. Pendent re-
view may then only occur where review of the otherwise nonappealable issue is
necessary to insure the appellant's right to review of the permissible issue. Id. at 449.
Judge Adams noted that the use of the "inextricably bound" test had been approved
by one commentator. Id. at 449 n. 11 (citing C. WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 102, at 513 (3d ed. 1976).
71. Id. at 449. The court noted that appellate court review of an interlocutory
class certification order "is--in the absence of extraordinary circumstances-a usur-
pation of the district court's role." Id. Additionally, the court noted, "any rule that
encourages a broad range of appeals under section 1292(a)(1) invites abuse." Id. For
a discussion of these policies against interlocutory appeals of nonfinal orders, see
notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra.
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would protect the court from spurious appeals brought by attaching prayers
for injunctive relief to any class action claim,7 2 and third, it would preserve
the final decision rule as intended by Congress.
7 3
Applying the Kershner facts to the newly formulated rule of law, the
majority disposed of plaintiffs' appeal. Judge Adams found that the "mere
nexus" between the two orders-the issue of indigency common to both-
would not support an appeal of the denial of class status.74 Noting that the
magistrate had completely disposed of the preliminary injunction issue
before addressing the class certification issue, Judge Adams concluded that
the two issues were "separate and distinct; in no way can they be said to be
'inextricably bound.' -75
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring, concluded that the policy against piece-
meal appeals embodied in sections 1291 and 1292(a)(1) and in Gardner v.
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. "counsels for an even more restrictive approach
than that suggested by the majority."'76 The Chief Judge would abandon
the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction altogether and hold that
"when a court of appeals reviews a district court's order with respect to in-
junctive relief, section 1292(a)(1) does not confer jurisdiction to review any
other order of the district court."
77
Judge Higginbotham, while concurring in the denial of a preliminary
injunction, dissented from the majority on the issue of the appealability of
the class certification order, concluding that both issues were "inter-
twined."' 7 8 He would have adopted the rule of the Second Circuit which
allows review where there is a sufficient overlap of factors relevant to both
72. 670 F.2d at 449. See, e.g., Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 433 F.2d 117, 120 (5th
Cir. 1970).
73. 670 F.2d at 449. It is interesting to note that the majority continued to leave
§ 1292(b) open for review of class certification orders. Id. at 449 n. 13. For a discus-
sion of the possible use of § 1292(b) in this regard, see note 34 supra.
74. 670 F.2d at 449-50.
75. Id. at 450. Appellants had argued that "[tihe fact that the [magistrate] dis-
cussed both issues in one opinion could just as easily indicate interrelationship as
could two separate opinions [show severability]." Reply Brief for Appellants at 3-4,
Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1982).
76. 670 F.2d at 450 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
77. Id. Chief Judge Seitz alternatively suggested "that § 1292(a)(1) confers ju-
risdiction to review only that portion of the order denying injunctive relief, and ...
we may not review any portion of the order that is not independently appealable."
Id. at 450 n.1 (Seitz, C.J., concurring). ChiefJudge Seitz felt this rule would be true
to the policies of appellate review and would provide needed certainty to this area of
the law. Id. at 451-52 (Seitz, C.J., concurring). ChiefJudge Seitz felt that the "inex-
tricably bound" test was particularly uncertain and vague and invited disputes
"whether a particular order is merely factually related or is inextricably bound up
with an appealable order." Id. at 451 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
78. Id. at 452 (Higginbotham, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Higginbot-
ham agreed that the rules of D'orio and Kohn, allowing review of an entire interlocu-
tory order, were too permissive, but felt the majority's approach was more restrictive
than necessary. Id. For a discussion of D'Iorio and Kohn, see notes 53-54 and accom-
panying text supra.
[Vol. 28: p. 674
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rulings. 79 Judge Higginbotham argued that such a rule would allow the
appellate court to "dispose of issues where very little extra work is
required."80
It is submitted that the Third Circuit has correctly retained the doctrine
of pendent appellate jurisdiction8 ' but has fashioned too limited a rule for
applying that doctrine.8 2 The Kershner majority limited its analysis to the
policies favoring adherence to the final decision rule;8 3 it is suggested that
the court's analysis required a more detailed discussion and consideration of
the policies favoring interlocutory review. While Judge Adams is correct in
79. 670 F.2d at 452-53 (Higginbotham, J., concurring and dissenting). For a
discussion of the Second Circuit's test, see notes 46-50 and accompanying text supra.
80. 670 F.2d at 453 (Higginbotham, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Hig-
ginbotham particularly emphasized the language of the Second Circuit cited by the
majority regarding the extra work required on appeal. Id. For a discussion of this
rationale, see notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra. In Kershner, Judge Higgin-
botham noted that the central factor of indigency was relevant to both issues, and
while conceding that the injunction issue could be decided without reference to the
class status issue, he would assume jurisdiction on the grounds of obvious overlap and
little extra effort. 670 F.2d at 453 (Higginbotham, J., concurring and dissenting).
81. The question facing the court can properly be divided into two parts: first,
does the appellate court have the power to hear a class certification appeal in con-
junction with an appeal from a denial of a preliminary injunction; and, second, if so,
will the court in its discretion hear the appeal. The first part of the question has been
often assumed but never fully answered. See notes 41-58 and accompanying text
supra. It is submitted that the Kershner court has implicitly recognized the power to
reach a pendent appeal. The test adopted by the Third Circuit would allow review
of an order not independently appealable in limited circumstances. See notes 70-73
and accompanying text supra. It is asserted that any rule not strictly limited to re-
view of a properly appealable order must implicitly recognize the power to review
beyond the literal terms of the jurisdictional statute.
Judge Adams' opinion is couched in terms of a nondiscretionary rule. 670 F.2d
at 449 ("[i]n such a situation, the appellate court has no choice"). It is asserted,
however, that Judge Adams' use of the "inextricably bound" language opens the
door to an exercise of discretion, at least so far as to determine whether the issues are
inextricable. Id. A true nondiscretionary rule is presented in Chief Judge Seitz' con-
curring opinion wherein he stated: "[t]hus, even when consideration of a district
court's ruling on a motion for preliminary injunctive relief can be said to affect a class
certification order, I believe that the [appellate] court should only [review] the for-
mer. . . ." Id. at 451 (Seitz, C.J., concurring). The Chief Judge noted, however,
that the lower court could take "cognizance" of the higher court's ruling on the prop-
erly appealable order as it affects the nonappealable order. Id. It is additionally
asserted that the result reached by the majority is correct and consistent with the
views of most courts and commentators that have addressed the question. For a dis-
cussion of the various authorities, see notes 41-58 and accompanying text supra.
82. It is additionally asserted that the majority's analysis is incomplete and fails
to adequately articulate a rationale for its decision. The court has rejected the rule of
strict statutory construction as suggested by Chief Judge Seitz. For a discussion of
the Seitz concurrence, see notes 76-77 and accompanying text supra. At the same
time, the court has also rejected a rule granting broad authority to review all concur-
rent orders. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra. However, in adopting a
middle path, the majority has failed to provide any flexibility in what is essentially a
discretionary rule. See notes 89-92 and accompanying text infra.
83. As has been noted, Judge Adams gave only cursory attention to the policy of
§ 1292(a)(1). See note 65 supra.
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his assertion that the Supreme Court has narrowly construed the injunctions
exception, the Court has required only that the statute be "approached gin-
gerly." 84 Such a requirement is necessary to preserve the nature of section
1292 as an exception to the general rule and to prevent the attaching of
spurious claims for injunctive relief in order to justify review of a vast array
of interlocutory orders.85 However, it is suggested that such a rule should
not be interpreted to preclude review where countervailing policies might
favor immediate appeal.
8 6
Judge Adams' identification of the policies favoring a strict limitation of
appellate review is essentially correct. 87 However, these policies may also be
served by a more flexible approach which allows greater discretion to the
appellate court and considers more carefully the policies favoring review,
particularly the economy of litigation and the prevention of irreparable
harm.8
8
It is submitted that the proper scope of discretionary review is embodied
in the test of the Second Circuit.8 9 The Second Circuit rule contemplates
review where there is such an overlap of issues-legal or factual-that review
is justified in the interest of convenience and economy to the courts and to
the litigants. 9° It is suggested that the key distinction between the rule for-
mulated by the Second Circuit and that of the Third Circuit is that the
Third Circuit contemplates review only when there exists, for whatever rea-
son, an impossibility of separating the issues,9i but the Second Circuit con-
templates a possibility of exercising discretionary review where related issues
84. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra.
85. See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 14, § 3937.
86. As has been noted, the final decision rule serves a valuable purpose in
preventing the disruption and inconvenience of "piecemeal" litigation. See notes 16-
17 and accompanying text supra. Nonetheless courts have recognized the harm that
may befall litigants as a result of that rule. For this reason, the rule has been de-
parted from, either by judicial construction or statutory exception. See notes 18-26
and accompanying text supra.
87. Judge Adams properly recognized that it is important to guard against the
potential abuse of "piecemeal" appeals, to preserve the authority of the trial judge,
and to prevent spurious appeals. See notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra.
88. The departures from the final decision rule have resulted from a need to
prevent irreparable harm. See notes 18-26 and accompanying text supra. Judge Ad-
ams recognized this policy in allowing a pendent appeal where a failure to resolve the
pendent claim would defeat the appellant's right to a determination of the properly
appealable claim. See note 70 and accompanying text supra. It is asserted that the
policy of preventing irreparable harm is served by review of the properly appealable
order, and that review of concurrent orders may be undertaken, in the discretion of
the court of appeals, where such review would further the economy and convenience
of litigation. See 670 F.2d at 452-53 (Higginbotham, J., concurring and dissenting).
89. For a discussion of the test employed by the Second Circuit, see notes 46-50
and accompanying text supra.
90. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
91. See note 70 and accompanying text supra. The Kershner holding requires that
the appealable order "cannot be resolved without reference to the nonappealable class
certification issue." 670 F.2d at 449 (emphasis in original). While Judge Adams is
correct in asserting that the "substantial overlap test restricts appellate review," it is
[Vol. 28: p. 674
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might otherwise be separable.92 Admittedly, the fears which encouraged the
majority of the Third Circuit to fashion the more limited rule might arise
under such a test; but where review would defeat those policies identified
with the final judgment rule or fail to serve the reasonable policies of inter-
locutory review, the discretion need not be exercised.
In the principal case, Judge Adams characterized the commonality of
issues as a "mere nexus."'93 It is asserted that such a characterization is cor-
rect and that a "mere nexus" would not even satisfy the broader test of the
Second Circuit. While the question of indigency in Kershner is common to
both issues, it is by no means determinative of the appeals from both or-
ders.94 The class certification issue involves proper consideration of class
identification as well as questions of superior alternatives and mootness and
requires a broader inquiry than that required for a determination of the
preliminary injunction issue. 95 In such a case, where the issues are separable
and distinct, it is asserted that the policies favoring interlocutory review do
not outweigh the rule of finality.
It is suggested that short of a strict rule of nonappealability, no rule can
offer clear guidance to litigants in this area. It is additionally asserted that
this does not pose a serious problem. Litigants will continue to seek (and
brief) appeals of issues thought by them to be necessary. It is only urged
that appellate courts recognize, when applying a dscret'onagy rule, the poten-
tial interests favoring interlocutory review before denying the appeal and
that such flexibility is better afforded by the test of the Second Circuit.
The effect of the Kershner decision remains to be seen. The key question
to be resolved will be the extent to which the rule will be limited to appeals
from class certification orders or whether it will be applied to a wide range of
interlocutory orders.96 Its clear and immediate impact will no doubt be to
intensify skirmishes over class certification in every civil rights action filed
submitted that that test is not, as Judge Adams implies, co-extensive with the Third
Circuit test.
92. See notes 49-50 and accompanying text supra.
93. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
94. Magistrate Durkin's report, adopted by the district court, characterized the
class of indigent inmates at Rockview facing denial of access to the courts as "indefi-
nite." See note 7 and accompanying text supra. Assuming the question of indigency
represents the mere commonality of a single issue, it could hardly be a "sufficient
overlap" of factors relevant to the determination of both orders. See notes 46-50 and
accompanying text supra. But see 670 F.2d at 452-53 (Higginbotham, J., concurring
and dissenting). Judge Higginbotham felt that as "there is a basic underlying ques-
tion relevant to both the injunction and class certification issues," the Second Circuit
test was met. Id. at 453.
95. All these issues were relevant to the denial of class certification in Kershner.
For a discussion of the trial court's denial of class status, see notes 6-7 supra. Of the
three issues posited, indigency was only relevant to the question of class identifica-
tion. Report of Magistrate, supra note 6, at 12.
96. It is important to note in this regard that the majority relied on the open-
ended character of a class certification order pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).
See 670 F.2d at 449. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Linesay, 437 U.S. at 469 ("such an
order is subject to revision in the District Court").
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within the Third Circuit. In such cases, where the relief sought will primar-
ily be injunctive, the court has effectively closed down immediate review of
such orders, and made the class certification battle the determinative phase
of the litigation.97 It is unlikely that the decision will stimulate the Supreme
Court to resolve the issue, as there is little conflict among the circuits. All
seem to be agreed that the power to review exists and there is not, as yet, a
wide disparity in interpreting the scope of discretion.
Charles B Congdon
97. For a discussion of the importance attached by litigants to the class certifica-
tion battle, see notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
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